assumptions actually hold on the Internet. While we find that standard modeling assumptions (e.g., the Gao-Rexford path preference policies) are well-grounded in reality, some of the responses beg for closer scrutiny (*e.g.,* using empirical measurements) and motivate new routing models.

While our survey provides a useful starting point, it also calls for more rigorous study of routing policies. Indeed, like any survey, our results suffer from biases (*e.g.,* larger networks are over represented) and "noise" resulting from misunderstandings of terminology. (Indeed, some comments we collected indicated that operators interpreted the term "peer" to mean "neighbor", rather than "settlement-free peer" as we had intended. Similarly, we had to discard the results of Q8 because our use of the term "neighbor-specific" (see [40]) was not understood.) Further exploration of the operational issues highlighted by this paper through targetted and larger-scale surveys is of value. More extensive empirical analyses and the development of new routing models are also valuable directions for future research.

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