BGP, the Internet’s interdomain routing protocol, is highly vulnerable to routing failures that result from unintentional misconﬁgurations or deliberate attacks. To defend against these failures, recent years have seen the adoption of the Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI), which currently authorizes 4% of the Internet’s routes. The RPKI is a completely new security infrastructure (requiring new servers, caches, and the design of new protocols), a fact that has given rise to some controversy . Thus, an alternative proposal has emerged: Route Origin Veriﬁcation (ROVER) [4, 7], which leverages the existing reverse DNS (rDNS) and DNSSEC to secure the interdomain routing system. Both RPKI and ROVER rely on a hierarchy of authorities to provide trusted information about the routing system. Recently, however,  argued that the misconﬁgured, faulty or compromised RPKI authorities introduce new vulnerabilities in the routing system, which can take IP preﬁxes oﬄine. Meanwhile, the designers of ROVER claim that it operates in a “fail-safe” mode, where “[o]ne could completely unplug a router veriﬁcation application at any time and Internet routing would continue to work just as it does today”. There has been debate in Internet community mailing lists  about the pros and cons of both approaches. This poster therefore compares the impact of ROVER failures to those of the RPKI, in a threat model that covers misconﬁgurations, faults or compromises of their trusted authorities.